A number of states make a suppressor or short-barreled firearm lawful only if it is registered, licensed, permitted, or otherwise authorized under federal law. Strip out the federal registration and those statutes do not disappear — they become unconditional bans. A 50-state survey of the drafting, why "the state law is moot" is the wrong answer, and why the Gun Control Act keeps short-barreled firearms gated even for buyers the injunction covers.
The seven-day stay lapsed at the end of August 12, 2026. The permanent injunction in the consolidated Silencer Shop Foundation v. ATF and Jensen v. ATF cases became operative at 12:01 a.m. Central on August 13, 2026, and the first commercial suppressor transfers without a Form 4 or a registry entry occurred that minute. The Department of Justice sought no stay and has publicly indicated it will not appeal, though the 60-day window to notice an appeal does not close until early October.
None of that changes a word of any state's penal code. A large group of state statutes make possession of suppressors, short-barreled rifles, or short-barreled shotguns lawful only on the condition that the item is registered — or that the possessor is licensed or authorized — under federal law. If the federal registration requirement stops applying to you, you may satisfy federal law and simultaneously fail your state's conditional exemption.
Separately, and largely unremarked: the Gun Control Act independently gates short-barreled rifles and shotguns at the dealer counter and at the state line. The August 5 holding is a Title 26 enumerated-powers holding. It does not reach Title 18.
The federal prohibition, the Gun Control Act, and your state's prohibition are three separate questions. Only the first was in front of Judge Hendrix.
The Problem in One Sentence
Federal deregulation is not federal authorization — and a state exemption written around a federal requirement can fail when the requirement does.
The holding in the consolidated Silencer Shop Foundation v. ATF and Jensen v. ATF cases — analyzed in detail in A Federal Court Just Held the NFA's Registration Scheme Unconstitutional for Untaxed Firearms — is an enumerated-powers holding. The court concluded that Congress enacted the challenged NFA provisions under its taxing power, that Congress eliminated the relevant taxes effective January 1, 2026, and that the registration and approval machinery attached to those taxes cannot stand on a power Congress never invoked. The plaintiffs' Second Amendment claims were dismissed as abandoned; the court never reached them.
That distinction is not academic. A Second Amendment holding would have said something about what states may do. An enumerated-powers holding says something about what Congress may do. If anything, a decision resting on the proposition that the federal government lacked authority in this area leaves the states' independent police power over the same items entirely undisturbed.
The uncomfortable version: the same reasoning that removes the federal requirement is the reasoning that confirms your state may regulate — or prohibit — the identical item without federal interference.
Why "the Requirement Is Gone, So the State Law Is Moot" Does Not Work
This is the most common reaction I have heard since August 5, and I understand its appeal: if a state statute says an item is lawful when registered federally, and federal registration no longer exists, then the condition is impossible and the statute must fall. Three problems.
1. The federal requirement has not gone anywhere
26 U.S.C. § 5841 remains on the books. The district court enjoined enforcement against specified parties; it repealed nothing, and a state court applying its own criminal code is not bound by an out-of-circuit district court's enumerated-powers holding as to non-parties. The absence of a federal appeal does not change this. A judgment that is never appealed is still a district court judgment with the preclusive reach the judgment itself defines — here, the plaintiffs and, where applicable, their members and customers. It does not become a nationwide repeal by virtue of the government declining to contest it.
More to the point, most of these state provisions ask a factual question — is this particular item registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record? — not a legal question about whether the federal requirement is enforceable. The fact is either true or it is not. A state prosecutor never has to engage the constitutional argument at all.
2. Impossibility is not a defense to a possessory offense
Even on outright federal repeal, the "I cannot comply" argument runs into a hard structural answer: compliance is always available, because the defendant can decline to possess the item. That is the difference between a conditional exemption and an entitlement. When a condition attached to an exception becomes unsatisfiable, the ordinary result is that the exception lapses and the general prohibition operates. The statute does not collapse. It simplifies.
3. Mootness is the wrong doctrine
Mootness is an Article III justiciability doctrine that governs whether a federal court may decide a live controversy. It is not a canon of statutory construction, and there is no general principle voiding a state penal statute because a federal condition it referenced became unavailable. The doctrines that actually bear on this are void-for-vagueness, the rule of lenity, and ex post facto principles — and each is a defense raised after an arrest, in front of a judge, at a defendant's expense.
Ex post facto is the weakest of the three here. Unlawful possession is generally a continuing offense, so the conduct punished is possession now, not acquisition then. That an item was lawfully acquired in 2024 does not immunize possession of it in 2027.
The Gun Control Act Gap: Why Short-Barreled Firearms Are a Different Problem
This section is new as of August 13, and it is the part of the analysis that retail messaging has largely gotten right in a single sentence and then buried.
The August 5 judgment addresses Title 26 — the National Firearms Act, enacted under the taxing power, with a registration and approval scheme the court held could not survive the elimination of the tax it served. The Gun Control Act of 1968 is Title 18, and it rests on the Commerce Clause. Judge Hendrix's reasoning does not touch it. If anything, the opinion draws a sharper line between the two statutes, because the entire holding depends on the NFA having no commerce hook.
Three Title 18 provisions matter here.
18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) — dealer transfers. A federal firearms licensee may not sell or deliver a destructive device, machine gun, short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle except as specifically authorized by the Attorney General consistent with public safety and necessity. Note the list. Silencers are not on it. That single omission is why the suppressor side of the injunction produces an over-the-counter transfer and the short-barreled side does not.
The practical trap is sharper than a bare "Form 4 still required." The authorization § 922(b)(4) demands has historically been delivered through the NFA approval process — an approved Form 4 has functioned as the Attorney General's specific authorization. A covered buyer is therefore in an odd position: the Title 18 requirement survives, and the only established administrative vehicle for satisfying it is the Title 26 machinery the injunction addresses. Whether ATF will process approvals for covered parties as a § 922(b)(4) authorization decoupled from NFA registration, create a separate mechanism, or take no position at all is unresolved. Until it is resolved, a dealer who delivers an SBR or SBS without authorization has a Title 18 exposure the injunction does not answer, and so does the recipient.
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.28 — interstate transport. Transporting a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, machine gun, or destructive device in interstate commerce requires prior written approval. This is the requirement behind the familiar ATF Form 5320.20. It is a Title 18 requirement, it applies to owners rather than only to licensees, and nothing in the August 5 judgment addresses it. An owner who treats an SBR as unregulated and drives it across a state line has a federal problem entirely separate from whatever the destination state's penal code says.
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) — machine guns. Untouched, and never at issue. Congress did not untax machine guns or destructive devices, so those categories sit outside the holding on both the Title 26 and Title 18 sides.
What this means in practice. Suppressors and AOWs are the categories where a covered buyer sees real change at the counter. Short-barreled rifles and shotguns are not, and the ordinary background check and Form 4473 remain in place for everything. An SBR owner reading celebratory coverage should understand that he is in the worst of both positions: no Title 18 relief federally, and — as the tables below show — some of the most exposed conditional-exemption drafting at the state level.
Four Drafting Patterns, Four Very Different Outcomes
Whether a state statute survives the disappearance of federal registration is almost entirely a question of how the legislature drafted the exception. Sorting statutes by drafting pattern is far more useful than sorting them by whether the state is considered friendly to NFA ownership. Two of the four patterns below appear in states no one thinks of as restrictive.
Pattern A — Registration-contingent exemption (highest exposure)
The prohibition is the operative rule; the fact of federal registration is the condition of escape. Georgia is the clearest example: possession of a sawed-off shotgun, sawed-off rifle, machine gun, or silencer is flatly prohibited, subject to an exemption for a person "authorized to possess the same because he has registered" the item under the National Firearms Act. Maryland prohibits short-barreled rifles and shotguns unless the item "has been registered with the federal government in accordance with federal law," and expressly places on the defendant the burden of proving lawful registration. Oregon makes registration "as required under federal law" an affirmative defense, with a companion provision barring arrest where the possessor carries documentation of that registration.
If there is no registration, there is nothing to prove. The exemption is not ambiguous — it is unmet.
Pattern B — Federal license, permit, or authorization required (highest exposure)
Worse than registration-contingent, because it requires an affirmative federal act that would no longer be issued. Michigan exempts a person "licensed by the secretary of the treasury of the United States or the secretary's delegate" to possess the device. Nevada bars machine guns and silencers "unless authorized by federal law," exempts persons "licensed, authorized or permitted" federally, and expressly places the burden of establishing that licensure on the possessor. Colorado treats silencers as dangerous weapons, with an affirmative defense for a person holding a "valid permit and license for possession." Connecticut excepts persons, firms, corporations, and museums "licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law" to possess. Arizona's prohibited-weapon offense does not apply to a person "specifically licensed, authorized or permitted" under state or federal law. Mississippi reaches persons "not duly authorized under federal law."
Note the recurring anachronism: several of these statutes still refer to the Secretary of the Treasury, though NFA administration moved to the Department of Justice in 2003. That is a separate drafting problem, and it does not help the owner.
Pattern C — Compliance-based exemption (moderate exposure)
These statutes ask whether the possessor complied with federal law rather than whether a registration exists. Pennsylvania gives a defense where the defendant "complied with the National Firearms Act." North Dakota criminalizes possession "unless that person has complied with the National Firearms Act." North Carolina excepts persons authorized under federal law and in compliance with 26 U.S.C. Chapter 53. Washington makes short-barreled rifle possession lawful "if the person is in compliance with applicable federal law," and Michigan's separate short-barreled firearm provision excepts an item "lawfully made, manufactured, transferred, or possessed under federal law."
The defensible reading is that a person who is not required to register is in compliance — there is nothing left to comply with. That is a real argument. It is also an argument, not a safe harbor, and it will be litigated by whoever gets arrested first. Wisconsin is the cautionary variant: its exception references compliance with the federal "licensing and registration requirements," which reintroduces the registration fact.
One point that has gotten better since August 12 and one that has not. Better: a Pattern C defendant can now say the federal government itself declined to contest the holding, which is worth something to the reasonableness of his reading even though it is not precedent. Not better: on the short-barreled side, a Pattern C exemption keyed to compliance with federal law generally — not the NFA specifically — arguably pulls in § 922(b)(4) and § 922(a)(4). Washington's "in compliance with applicable federal law" and Michigan's "lawfully . . . transferred, or possessed under federal law" are both broad enough to reach Title 18. A covered buyer who takes an SBR without the Attorney General's authorization may fail a Pattern C state exemption for a Title 18 reason rather than a Title 26 one.
Pattern D — Violation-framed or express alternative (lowest exposure)
The best-drafted statutes anticipated this. Iowa prohibits knowing possession of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun "in violation of federal law" — if federal law is not violated, there is no state offense. Minnesota reaches only "a suppressor that is not lawfully possessed under federal law." Missouri's offense reaches a silencer, machine gun, or short-barreled rifle or shotgun only when possessed "in violation of federal law."
Texas formerly illustrated the other durable approach — an express alternative for items "otherwise not subject to that registration requirement." That clause is no longer load-bearing in Texas, because S.B. 1596 removed short-barrel firearms from the prohibited-weapons offense altogether effective September 1, 2025, and H.B. 957 had removed silencers in 2021. The drafting model remains sound even though Texas no longer relies on it.
The contrast case — read the operative verb
Montana shows why the drafting patterns above must be applied to the actual text rather than to a state's reputation. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-337 does not create a stand-alone suppressor possession offense. Instead, possession of a silencer "that is not registered under federal law" is prima facie evidence of a purpose to use it to commit an offense. That is a genuine evidentiary risk, but it is not a registration-contingent possession ban, and it does not belong in the same tier.
Washington requires the same care on the suppressor side. Its provision is framed around unlawful use of a suppressor not "legally registered and possessed in accordance with federal law," rather than around bare possession. The exposure is real but narrower, and it turns on conduct rather than status.
How to read the tables. Every entry marked VERIFIED was read against the operative statutory text or an official compilation. The tables include only provisions verified that way; states with no conditioning language are discussed in the text rather than listed.
Currency warning. The April 2025 industry survey that circulates most widely predates important later legislation. Texas removed short-barrel firearms from Penal Code § 46.05 effective September 1, 2025. South Dakota removed suppressors from its controlled-weapon definition effective July 1, 2026. Kansas enacted Senate Substitute for H.B. 2501 in 2026 removing its criminal suppressor prohibition, effective on publication in the statute book — confirm the publication date before treating it as operative. Alaska S.B. 243 was introduced in 2026 to remove suppressors from the prohibited-weapon definition. Mississippi H.B. 912 (2023) contains a contingent repeal of § 97-37-31 whose effective date depends on a specified trigger; it should not be described as presently operative without confirming that the contingency has occurred.
Legislative velocity warning, added August 13. Now that the injunction is operative and unappealed, expect state legislative activity in both directions in the 2027 sessions — curative repeals in states that never wanted their own trap, and new stand-alone state offenses in states that were content to let federal registration do the work. Every entry below should be re-verified against the operative code at the time of reliance, not read as a durable snapshot.
The Suppressor Survey
Highest exposure — registration, license, or authorization required
Suppressor possession conditioned on a federal registration, license, permit, or authorization that would stop existing.
| State | Provision | Conditioning language | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Georgia | O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-122, 16-11-124(4) | Exemption for a person authorized "because he has registered" the item under the NFA | A |
| Oregon | ORS 166.272(3)–(4) | Affirmative defense that item "was registered as required under federal law"; no-arrest provision keyed to carrying documentation | A |
| Alaska | Alaska Stat. § 11.61.200(c), (h) | Silencers remain a prohibited weapon; NFA registration operates as an affirmative defense. S.B. 243 (2026) proposes removing suppressors from the prohibited-weapon definition | A |
| Michigan | MCL 750.224(3)(c) | Exemption for a person "licensed by the secretary of the treasury … or the secretary's delegate" | B |
| Nevada | NRS 202.350(1)(b), (6) | Prohibited "unless authorized by federal law"; exemption for federal licensure, authorization or permission, with the burden on the possessor | B |
| Colorado | Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-102 | Firearm silencers are "dangerous weapons"; possession is a class 5 felony, with an affirmative defense for a person holding a "valid permit and license for possession" | B |
| Connecticut | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-211 | Possession prohibited, with an exception for persons, firms, corporations, or museums "licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law" to possess, control, or own | B |
| Arizona | Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3101, 13-3102(C)(4) | Prohibited-weapon offense does not apply to a person "specifically licensed, authorized or permitted" under state or federal law — an authorization-based exception, not a pure compliance clause | B |
| Mississippi | Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-31; 2023 H.B. 912 | Reaches persons "not duly authorized under federal law." H.B. 912 provides a contingent repeal whose effective date depends on a specified trigger; do not treat the repeal as effective without confirming that contingency | B |
| Ohio | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2923.11(K), 2923.17, 2923.18 | Suppressors are "dangerous ordnance"; possession is prohibited subject to statutory exceptions and Ohio license or temporary-permit provisions | B |
Moderate exposure — compliance-framed, or reaching use rather than possession
Exemptions keyed to compliance with federal law rather than to the existence of a registration, plus provisions that reach conduct rather than status. Defensible, but untested.
| State | Provision | Conditioning language |
|---|---|---|
| Pennsylvania | 18 Pa.C.S. § 908(b)(1) | Defense that defendant "complied with the National Firearms Act" |
| North Dakota | N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-05-01 | Unlawful "unless that person has complied with the National Firearms Act" |
| North Carolina | N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.8(c)(3) | Exception for persons authorized by federal law to possess the covered weapon and in compliance with 26 U.S.C. Chapter 53 |
| Wisconsin | Wis. Stat. § 941.298 | Exception for a person who has complied with federal "licensing and registration requirements" — hybrid wording that keeps the registration issue directly relevant |
| Washington | RCW 9.41.250(1)(c) | Use of a suppressor is unlawful unless it is "legally registered and possessed in accordance with federal law." The offense is framed around conduct rather than bare possession, which narrows but does not eliminate the exposure |
Low exposure — violation-framed, cured, or silent
States where the drafting anticipates federal change, the legislature has already fixed the problem, or there is no conditioned state suppressor offense.
| State | Position |
|---|---|
| Minnesota | Minn. Stat. § 609.66 subd. 1a(a)(1) reaches only "a suppressor that is not lawfully possessed under federal law" |
| Iowa | Iowa Code § 724.1C prohibits SBR/SBS possession "in violation of federal law"; suppressor provisions at §§ 724.1–724.3 |
| Missouri | Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.020 reaches a silencer, machine gun, or short-barreled rifle or shotgun only when possessed "in violation of federal law" |
| Montana | Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-337 does not itself prohibit possession. Possession of a silencer not registered under federal law is prima facie evidence of a purpose to use it to commit an offense — a distinct evidentiary risk, not a registration-contingent possession ban |
| Texas | Problem cured. H.B. 957 (2021) removed silencers from the prohibited-weapons list; S.B. 1596 then removed short-barrel firearms from Penal Code § 46.05 effective September 1, 2025 |
| South Dakota | Problem cured. S.B. 2 removed suppressors from the "controlled weapon" definition; signed February 10, 2026, effective July 1, 2026. The prior provision, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-6, was license-and-registration framed |
| Kansas | Problem cured by enacted legislation. Senate Substitute for H.B. 2501 was signed in 2026 and removes the criminal prohibition against firearm suppressors; the act takes effect on publication in the statute book. Confirm the publication date before relying on it |
A state's absence from these tables is not a clearance. The tables above catalog provisions that condition lawfulness on federal registration, licensure, or authorization. A number of states have no such conditioning language, and in those states federal deregulation should translate directly into practical deregulation — but that conclusion depends on the text of the particular state's code, which must be read rather than inferred from an omission here. Maryland is the cautionary example: it has no conditioned suppressor offense, and it has one of the most exposed short-barreled firearm provisions in the country.
Where the question does not arise
Nine jurisdictions prohibit civilian suppressor possession outright, and the federal ruling does not touch them: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. A state ban applies with or without an approved federal form. Counts of "eight" that appear in some coverage omit the District of Columbia; the distinction matters to anyone who lives or works there.
The Short-Barreled Firearm Gap
Every published survey of this problem is a suppressor survey. Maryland appears on none of them — because Maryland's exposure is on the short-barreled rifle and shotgun side. The SBR and SBS provisions are a separate body of state law, they use the same conditional drafting, and no one has mapped them. If you own an SBR, a suppressor-focused list tells you nothing about your position.
Read this table alongside the Gun Control Act section above. The SBR owner faces two independent gates that the injunction does not open: the § 922(b)(4) authorization requirement at the dealer counter, and whichever of the four drafting patterns his state used.
Short-barreled rifle and shotgun provisions identified during this review. This is a partial list; a complete SBR/SBS survey remains to be done.
| State | Provision | Conditioning language | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maryland | Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 5-203 | Unlawful unless the item "has been registered with the federal government in accordance with federal law"; § 5-203(b) places the burden of proving registration on the defendant | A |
| Nevada | NRS 202.275(3)(b) | Exception for a person "to whom such a rifle or shotgun is registered with the United States Department of the Treasury" | A |
| Oregon | ORS 166.272 | Same registration-contingent affirmative defense; covers SBR and SBS alongside suppressors and machine guns | A |
| Georgia | O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-122, 16-11-124(4) | Same registration-contingent exemption; covers sawed-off rifle and sawed-off shotgun | A |
| Ohio | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2923.11(K), 2923.17, 2923.18 | Sawed-off firearms are "dangerous ordnance"; possession prohibited subject to statutory exceptions and Ohio license or temporary-permit provisions | B |
| Washington | RCW 9.41.190(2), (4) | SBR lawful "if the person is in compliance with applicable federal law"; SBS limited to pre-July 1, 1994 acquisition plus federal compliance — a hard cap independent of this problem | C / hard cap |
| Michigan | MCL 750.224b(3) | Exception for an SBR or SBS "lawfully made, manufactured, transferred, or possessed under federal law" — notably better drafted than Michigan's suppressor provision | C |
| Iowa | Iowa Code § 724.1C | Prohibits knowing possession "in violation of federal law" — model drafting | D |
| Texas | 2025 Tex. S.B. 1596; Tex. Penal Code § 46.05 | Problem cured. S.B. 1596 removed short-barrel firearms from the prohibited-weapons offense effective September 1, 2025 | No trap |
What This Means for Owners
1. Preserve your paperwork permanently. An approved Form 1 or Form 4 is documentary proof of a historical fact, and no subsequent ruling erases that fact. In Maryland and Nevada the statute expressly puts the burden of proving registration or federal authorization on the defendant. That document is the defense. Do not discard it because a court said the requirement was invalid.
2. Read your own exemption clause before anything else. Pull the actual statutory text. The operative words are usually four or five of them — "registered," "licensed," "authorized," "in compliance with," "in violation of," "not subject to" — and they determine which of the four patterns governs you.
3. Check the verb, not just the condition. A statute reaching possession is a different problem from one reaching use, and a statute creating an evidentiary presumption is different again. Montana and Washington both illustrate the point.
4. Treat the injunction's scope, Title 18, and your state code as three independent questions. Being a covered plaintiff, member, or customer under the federal injunction tells you nothing about whether § 922(b)(4) is satisfied, and nothing about whether your state exemption is met. Confirm your covered status against the final judgment rather than against a checkout page.
5. Do not act on retailer marketing — and understand exactly where it stops. The dominant retail framing since August 12 has been a two-bucket count: roughly 27 states where the transfer proceeds with no form, and roughly 15 that still require a Form 4. That count is a fair description of state statutes that separately mandate NFA-style registration paperwork. It is not a map of the conditional-exemption problem, and the two do not overlap cleanly.
Georgia, Nevada, Michigan, Colorado, Connecticut, and Arizona illustrate the gap precisely. None of them imposes a state Form 4 requirement. A buyer in each of them can therefore land in the permissive bucket at checkout — and each of them conditions the lawfulness of possession on a federal registration, license, or authorization the buyer will not have. The retailer's statement is accurate on its own terms and still tells that buyer nothing about the statute he is actually exposed to. Advertising describing a purchase as requiring no form and no registry entry is one company's reading of a federal injunction. It is not an opinion on your state's penal code, and it is not a defense.
6. Ask the question twice if you move or travel. An item lawful where you bought it may sit inside a conditional exemption you cannot satisfy where you are going. On the short-barreled side, add the separate federal interstate-transport approval requirement at 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.28 — an owner-facing Title 18 obligation that the injunction does not reach.
7. If you are outside the injunction, nothing has changed for you. Form 1 and Form 4 remain the law for everyone the judgment does not cover, and taking possession of an unregistered NFA firearm outside the injunction remains a federal felony. The absence of a government appeal is not an amnesty and does not operate prospectively as to non-parties.
What This Means for Legislatures
Several states have already demonstrated the fix, and it is not complicated: remove the item from the regulated category, or replace the registration condition with language that survives federal change. Texas removed silencers in 2021 and short-barrel firearms in 2025. South Dakota removed suppressors from its controlled-weapon definition in 2026. Kansas followed in the same session.
For states that intend to keep a prohibition on the books, the drafting lesson is that Pattern D language costs nothing and prevents everything. Two model clauses do the work: reaching only items possessed "in violation of federal law," as Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri do; or excepting items "otherwise not subject to that registration requirement," the alternative Texas used before it repealed the offense outright. Either converts a statute from a trap into a durable rule. States that want to keep their prohibitions can keep them. The point is that a legislature should decide what its own law does, rather than delegating that decision to whatever a federal district court does to Title 26 next.
The 2027 sessions are where this gets resolved. A state that takes no action has not preserved the status quo — it has left a conditional exemption in place that a growing number of its residents can no longer satisfy.
Where the Federal Case Stands
Final judgment was entered August 5, 2026 in the consolidated Silencer Shop Foundation v. ATF, No. 6:25-CV-056 (N.D. Tex.), and Jensen v. ATF, No. 6:26-CV-277, and stayed for seven calendar days to permit the government to seek appellate relief. The government sought no stay from either the district court or the Fifth Circuit. The stay lapsed at the end of August 12, and the permanent injunction became operative at 12:01 a.m. Central on August 13, 2026. Commercial suppressor transfers without a Form 4 and without entry in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record occurred at that time in Texas.
Two qualifications on the appellate posture, both of which matter.
The commitment not to appeal is political, not docketed. The administration has publicly indicated that the Department of Justice will not appeal. The formal period to notice an appeal from a final judgment in a civil case in which the United States is a party runs 60 days, which places the outer date in early October 2026. Until that period lapses without a notice of appeal, the government retains the option. A change of position before then would not be extraordinary.
The relief remains party-specific. It reaches the plaintiffs and, where applicable, their agencies, political subdivisions, members, and customers — current and future — as defined in the final judgment. It is not nationwide relief, it does not repeal 26 U.S.C. § 5841, and it does not bind states. Machine guns and destructive devices, which Congress did not untax, are unaffected. Whether a particular person, trust, business, firearm, or transaction is covered requires reading the final judgment against that person's actual facts.
The second-order risk I flagged on August 9 is meaningfully reduced but not eliminated. An owner who acquires an unregistered item during a live injunction, and then sees that injunction reversed, has no obvious path back into the registry — a problem with roots running back to Haynes v. United States. With no appeal noticed, the near-term probability of that scenario is low. It does not reach zero until the 60-day window closes in early October, and it never reaches zero as to a future case in another circuit reaching the opposite conclusion. Brown v. ATF is pending in the Eastern District of Missouri. A circuit split on the constitutionality of the registration scheme would put the question in front of the Supreme Court, and that is a multi-year horizon during which the item in your safe stays in your safe.
Frequently Asked Questions
The government did not appeal. Doesn't that make the ruling nationwide?
No. An unappealed district court judgment is still a district court judgment, and this one defines its own reach: the plaintiffs and, where applicable, their members and customers. Declining to appeal preserves the judgment as written; it does not enlarge it. Everyone outside the covered channel remains subject to Form 1 and Form 4, and possession of an unregistered NFA firearm outside the injunction remains a federal felony.
If the federal requirement is enjoined, isn't my state law unenforceable?
Not automatically. Most of these provisions ask whether a registration exists, which is a fact, not whether the federal requirement is constitutional, which is a legal conclusion. If the registration does not exist, the state exemption is unmet and the underlying prohibition operates. Mootness governs whether a federal court may hear a case; it does not void state penal statutes.
Can I now buy a short-barreled rifle without a Form 4?
Not at a dealer, even if the injunction covers you. The Gun Control Act separately provides at 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) that a licensee may not sell or deliver a short-barreled rifle or shotgun except as specifically authorized by the Attorney General. That is a Title 18 provision resting on the Commerce Clause, and the August 5 holding is a Title 26 enumerated-powers holding that does not reach it. Silencers are not on the § 922(b)(4) list, which is why the suppressor side and the short-barreled side came out differently.
Does the ruling make suppressors or SBRs legal?
No. It holds that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers in maintaining registration for untaxed NFA firearms. It is a limit on federal authority, not a declaration that possession is protected, and it leaves state police power untouched.
Which drafting language is most dangerous?
Language conditioning lawfulness on the item being registered, or on the possessor being licensed, permitted, or authorized by a federal officer. Both require an artifact that would stop being issued. Language keyed to compliance with federal law is more defensible, and language reaching only items possessed in violation of federal law, or expressly covering items not subject to the registration requirement, is the most durable.
Does it matter whether my statute reaches possession or only use?
Yes, and it is easy to miss. Washington's suppressor provision is framed around unlawful use of a suppressor not legally registered and possessed under federal law, rather than around bare possession. Montana does not create a stand-alone suppressor possession offense at all — unregistered possession is prima facie evidence of a purpose to use the item to commit an offense. Both are real risks, but they are different risks from a flat possession ban.
My retailer says my state is one of the 27 where no form is required. Am I clear?
That statement is about whether your state separately mandates NFA-style registration paperwork. It is not a statement about whether your state's possession statute conditions lawfulness on a federal registration you will not have. Georgia, Nevada, Michigan, Colorado, Connecticut, and Arizona all fall in the permissive bucket on the first question and in the highest-exposure tier on the second.
Won't ex post facto protect items I already own?
Less than you would hope. Possession offenses are generally continuing offenses, so the conduct at issue is present possession rather than past acquisition. Vagueness and the rule of lenity are usually the stronger arguments — and all of them are raised after an arrest.
What is the single most useful thing to do today?
Keep your existing approvals, read your own state's exemption clause, confirm whether the final judgment actually covers you, and treat short-barreled firearms as a separate and more constrained question than suppressors.
Current-law verification note. This revision incorporates current-law checks completed August 9, 2026, including official legislative and code materials for Texas S.B. 1596, Kansas Senate Substitute for H.B. 2501, Washington RCW 9.41.250, Ohio §§ 2923.11 and 2923.17, Arizona § 13-3102, Montana § 45-8-337, Michigan § 750.224b, Connecticut § 53a-211, and Mississippi H.B. 912. Mississippi H.B. 912 is treated as contingent rather than presently effective. The August 13, 2026 revision adds the Gun Control Act analysis and updates the federal procedural posture through the lapse of the stay; the Title 18 discussion should be confirmed against ATF's operative position on § 922(b)(4) authorization for covered parties, which as of this writing has not been publicly stated.
Silencer Shop Found. v. ATF, No. 6:25-CV-056 (N.D. Tex.), consol. with Jensen v. ATF, No. 6:26-CV-277 — Memorandum Opinion and Order and Final Judgment, Aug. 5, 2026 · 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5822, 5841, 5861 · 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(4), 922(b)(4), 922(o) · 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.28, 478.98, 478.99 · One Big Beautiful Bill Act — NFA tax provisions effective Jan. 1, 2026 · Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) · Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) · Brown v. ATF (E.D. Mo.), pending · Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 5-203 · O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-122, 16-11-124 · ORS 166.272 · Alaska Stat. § 11.61.200; 2026 Alaska S.B. 243 · MCL 750.224; MCL 750.224b · NRS 202.275; NRS 202.350 · Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-102 · Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-211 · Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3101, 13-3102(C)(4) · Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-31; 2023 Miss. H.B. 912 · Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2923.11, 2923.17, 2923.18 · RCW 9.41.190; RCW 9.41.250 · 18 Pa.C.S. § 908 · N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-05-01 · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.8(c)(3) · Wis. Stat. § 941.298 · Minn. Stat. § 609.66 subd. 1a · Iowa Code § 724.1C · Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.020 · Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-337 · Tex. Penal Code § 46.05; 2021 Tex. H.B. 957; 2025 Tex. S.B. 1596 · 2026 S.D. S.B. 2 · 2026 Kan. Senate Sub. for H.B. 2501.
Related reading: for the federal ruling itself, see A Federal Court Just Held the NFA's Registration Scheme Unconstitutional for Untaxed Firearms. For how the litigation got here, see Could the NFA Registration Requirement Be Struck Down? The 2026 Lawsuits Explained — and for ATF's parallel deregulatory rulemaking track, see The Final Comment Window Is Closing on ATF's 34-Rule Package. Now that the injunction is operative, see The NFA Injunction Is in Effect. Are You Actually Covered? for exactly whose purchases it protects.
Attorney Advertising. I am admitted to practice law in Maryland only. For matters governed by state law, legal representation is limited to Maryland; individuals located elsewhere may be referred to counsel licensed in their jurisdiction. This article discusses the law of multiple states for general informational purposes and is not legal advice as to any jurisdiction. NFA trust documents for clients outside Maryland are a document preparation service and are not legal advice for those jurisdictions. State statutes change mid-session and courts stay and revive them; no entry should be relied on without confirming the operative text as of the date of reliance. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Do not send confidential information through this website. Schedule a consultation to discuss your specific situation.
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