Why Hawaii Just Lost at the Supreme Court: Wolford v. Lopez and the End of the 'Vampire Rule'

For a decade, the most gun-restrictive states searched for ways to preserve their carry regimes after the Supreme Court expanded the right to bear arms. Hawaii's answer was among the most aggressive — and on June 25, 2026, in Wolford v. Lopez, the Court struck it down. The decision draws a bright line under one of the most common post-Bruen workarounds: forcing licensed permit holders to get a property owner's express permission before carrying onto private property open to the public.

The Law That Fell

The provision at issue came from Hawaii's Act 52 of 2023, codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134–9.5(a). It made it a crime for a licensed permit holder to carry a firearm — loaded or not, operable or not, concealed or open — onto the "private property of another" unless the owner, lessee, operator, or manager had given express authorization. Consent had to take one of two forms: unambiguous written or verbal permission, or "clear and conspicuous signage" welcoming firearms.

Critics dubbed it the "vampire rule": like the creatures of folklore, a lawful gun owner could not cross the threshold without an invitation.

In practice, the rule inverted the ordinary common-law presumption. Normally, a business open to the public extends an implied license to enter; the owner can revoke it by posting a sign or telling you to leave. Hawaii flipped that default for anyone carrying a firearm, so that silence meant "no." As the majority illustrated, a permit holder running weekday errands — the gas station, a fast-food lunch, the drug store, the dry cleaner, the supermarket — could become "a criminal at least six times over" simply for entering establishments that had not affirmatively opted in.

How the Court Got There: Bruen Step One

The Court applied the familiar two-step framework described in Bruen. At step one, a court asks only whether the challenged law burdens conduct covered by the Second Amendment's plain text. That question was easy: the petitioners are among "the people," and they sought to "bear" "arms" for self-defense. Whatever else can be said about Hawaii's rule, it plainly regulates arms-bearing conduct, so it is presumptively unconstitutional and the analysis proceeds to step two.

The State's central argument was that carrying a gun onto someone else's property was never part of the pre-existing right at all — that the case was really about property law and a State's power to set consent defaults. The majority (and, at greater length, Justice Barrett's concurrence) rejected the framing. A property rule that singles out firearms for disfavored treatment still "implicates the Second Amendment," just as a hypothetical rule requiring express permission to wear religious garb onto public-facing property would implicate the First. Whether such a law survives is a step-two question, not a reason to skip the inquiry entirely.

Step Two: Why Hawaii's History Failed

To justify a modern restriction under Bruen, the government must point to historical analogues that are "relevantly similar" in both how and why they burdened the right. Hawaii offered three categories. The Court found each wanting.

1. The "Spirit of Aloha" argument

Hawaii first leaned on its own two-century tradition of disfavoring public carry, dating to an 1833 edict of King Kamehameha III. The majority answered that the Second Amendment "has the same meaning in all parts of the United States." It cannot yield to "the spirit of Aloha" in Hawaii any more than it bent to the spirit of the Big Apple in Bruen or the Windy City in McDonald. Local attitudes, the Court held, can neither shrink nor inflate a nationally incorporated right.

2. The 18th-century anti-poaching statutes

Hawaii's strongest analogues were colonial and early-state laws — a 1721 Pennsylvania act, a 1722 New Jersey statute, a 1728 Maryland law, a 1763 New York law, and a 1771 New Jersey law — that barred carrying guns or hunting on another's enclosed land without permission. But those laws targeted unauthorized hunting. Their "why" was the distinctive harm of poaching: theft of game, stray gunfire, damage to crops and livestock. They applied to lands where game could be found, not to the retail establishments people visit daily. The gap between an anti-poaching rule and a blanket ban on carry at the corner store was, in the Court's words, "just too wide."

3. The 1893 Oregon law and the 1865 Louisiana Black Code

The remaining analogues fared worse. The 1893 Oregon statute was a late outlier that likely regulated hunting on enclosed land, not commerce. And Hawaii's most striking citation — an 1865 Louisiana statute barring the carry of firearms on another's premises without consent — was part of that State's notorious Black Code, enacted to disarm newly freed Black citizens and leave them defenseless. The Court held it carried no weight: it was neither widespread nor widely accepted, and its purpose was the subordination of freedmen, not a neutral property principle. Discriminatory enactments designed to disarm newly freed Black citizens cannot establish the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Justice Barrett put the point bluntly — the "why" of the Black Codes shares nothing with any legitimate modern aim, so the analogy fails on its own terms.

The Dissents

Justice Kagan wrote a brief solo dissent. She would have upheld the law as a modern analogue of the founding-era statutes that conditioned armed entry on a landowner's consent, reasoning that the "how" was identical and the "why" sufficiently close, without reaching Bruen's step one or the Black Code question.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented at length. Her core position: this is a case about the right to exclude — a foundational stick in the bundle of property rights — not about gun rights. Because no one has a right to enter private property without consent, she argued, the case should end at step one, and States should retain the power to set whether the required consent is implied or express. She also contended the majority reworked Bruen's step one by stripping out the historical understanding that, in her view, has always informed the "plain text" inquiry. Notably, she added that she thinks Bruen was wrongly decided, but that the majority should at least apply it faithfully.

What It Means — Especially in Maryland

The practical footprint is narrower than the headline suggests, and also more pointed. In most of the country, the law already assumes a permit holder may enter public-facing private property while armed unless the owner says otherwise — so nothing changes. The decision bites in the handful of states that adopted Hawaii's "flipped default" after Bruen. Justice Alito's majority opinion itself cited their statutes — identifying these as the states that "flipped this default rule" in the wake of Bruen: California (Cal. Penal Code § 26230(a)(26)), New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6(a)(24)), New York (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01–d(1)), and Maryland (Md. Crim. Law § 6–411(d)).

For Maryland permit holders, this matters directly. Md. Crim. Law § 6–411 imposes the same express-consent default for carry on private property. Wolford did not strike the Maryland statute — that provision was not before the Court — but the reasoning is squarely on point, and the Maryland rule now rests on the same historical foundation the Court just rejected. Holders of a Maryland carry permit should expect the constitutionality of § 6–411 to be litigated, and should watch for enforcement guidance and any legislative response in Annapolis. Until Maryland's statute is repealed or invalidated, permit holders should continue to comply with existing law while closely monitoring litigation and legislative developments.

This is part of a broader shift in which the courts — and now the federal government — are pressing back on state firearms restrictions. For how that is playing out in active litigation, see the Justice Department's Second Amendment enforcement campaign and the Supreme Court's coming AR-15 case.

What the Decision Does Not Do

A few important limits. First, Wolford does not touch a private owner's own authority: every property owner in these states may still bar firearms from their premises by posting a sign or withdrawing consent. The decision limits what the State may presume — not what individual owners may choose. Second, it does not disturb legitimate "sensitive places" restrictions — schools, government buildings, and the like — recognized since Heller. Third, the Court once again declined to resolve whether the controlling historical period for incorporated Second Amendment claims is 1791 or 1868, an open question flagged the same term in United States v. Hemani. Finally, the case was reversed and remanded; downstream proceedings will work out the remedy.

The Takeaway

Wolford is the Court's clearest signal since Bruen that it will not tolerate creative end-runs around the carry right. Alito's opinion closed with a warning to states and lower courts against carving fresh exceptions into the Second Amendment. For the four sister states still enforcing Hawaii-style defaults — Maryland among them — the Court has signaled that attempts to recreate broad carry restrictions through default property rules are unlikely to survive constitutional review.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the Supreme Court decide in Wolford v. Lopez?

By a 6–3 vote on June 25, 2026, the Court held that Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public without the owner's express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, reversing the Ninth Circuit.

What was the "vampire rule"?

It was a nickname for Hawaii's default rule under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134–9.5. Like a vampire needing an invitation to enter, a lawful gun owner could not carry onto public-facing private property unless the owner affirmatively said yes, by signage or express permission. Silence meant the carry was presumptively unlawful.

Does this ruling affect Maryland?

Not directly — the Maryland statute was not before the Court — but the reasoning applies. Maryland's Md. Crim. Law § 6–411 imposes the same express-consent default the Court just rejected in Hawaii's law. The Maryland provision remains on the books for now but is expected to be challenged. Maryland wear-and-carry permit holders should monitor developments closely.

Can private businesses still ban guns?

Yes. The decision addresses only the default rule the State imposes. Any property owner may still prohibit firearms on their premises by posting a sign or withdrawing consent. Sensitive-place restrictions recognized since Heller — such as schools and government buildings — are also unaffected.

Which other states are impacted?

The Court identified four other states that adopted the same post-Bruen approach: California, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland. The analogous provisions in those states now rest on the historical foundation the Court found insufficient.

Related reading: for the federal government's affirmative push on gun rights, see The Justice Department Enlists the Civil Rights Division to Defend the Second Amendment, and for the rifle case that could reshape the landscape, see The Supreme Court Will Decide Whether the Second Amendment Protects the AR-15.